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JURISDICTION AND NATURE OF PROCEEDINGS BELOW
On August 21-23, 1984, the Plaintiffs1 action
came on for trial before a jury in the Third Judicial
District Court of Salt Lake County, the Honorable J.
Dennis Frederick presiding.

The jury returned a

verdict in favor of the Plaintiffs.

After the verdict

was returned, the Defendant-Respondent Capitol Thrift
and Loan's ("Capitol Thrift") motions for directed
verdict and for judgment notwithstanding the verdict
were denied. TR.421.

Capitol Thrift appealed the

judgment to this Court, which transferred the case to
the Utah Court of Appeals for decision.
of Appeals reversed the jury verdict.

The Utah Court
A copy of the

Court of Appeals opinion is attached as Addendum "A".
Plaintiff-Appellants f ("Plaintiff" ) petition
for a rehearing, before the Court of Appeals was denied
on December 2, 1987.
"B".

The Order is attached as Addendum

On December 30, 1987, Plaintiff filed a petition

for Writ of Certiorari which was granted by this Court
on February 23, 1988.

QUESTIONS PRESENTED FOR REVIEW
I.

Did the Court of Appeals err in

reversing the jury verdict when it found that the

-2evidence was insufficient to support a civil conspiracy
claim.
II.

Did the trial court err when it denied

the motions for directed verdict and for judgment
notwithstanding verdict.
III.

Did the trial court err in instructing

the jury that punitive damages can be awarded on a
different standard of proof than that applied to the
underlying wrongful act complained of.

REFERENCE TO THE COURT OF APPEALS OPINIONS
1.

Opinion filed November 16, 1987 by the

Court of Appeals in Case No. 860072-CA, reversing a
jury verdict against Capitol Thift and Loan in favor of
the Plaintiff.

Israel Pagan Estate v. Cannon, 746 P.2d

785 (Utah App. 1987).
2.

Attached as Addendum "A".

Order of the Court of Appeals dated

December 2, 1987, denying the petition for rehearing.
Attached as Addendum "B".

CONTROLLING PROVISIONS OF UTAH
CONSTITUTION AND STATUTES
1.

Utah Constitution, Article I, Section 10.

2.

U-C.A. Section 78-2-2(5)(1988).

-33,

Rule 43, Rules of the Utah Supreme Court.

These provisions are set forth in the
attached Addendum C.

STATEMENT OF THE CASE
Plaintiffs initiated this action alleging
that the Defendants conspired to defraud the now
deceased Israel Pagan in the sale of his house.

In

August, 1984, the case came on for trial before a jury
in the Third Judicial District Court of Salt Lake
County, the Honorable J. Dennis Frederick presiding.
The jury returned a verdict in favor of Plaintiffs and
awarded both compensatory and punitive damages.

The

District Court denied Capitol Thrift's motions for
directed verdict and for judgment notwithstanding the
verdict.
Capitol Thrift appealed the judgment to this
Court, which transferred the case to the Court of
Appeals for decision.

The Court of Appeals reversed

the jury verdict as to Capitol Thrift, and remanded for
proceedings consistent with the Opinion which is
attached as Addendum "A11 . The Court of Appeals
reversed the verdict because it did not find sufficient
evidence against Capitol Thrift to support Plaintiffs'
conspiracy theory.

-4-

STATEMENT OF FACTS
Sometime prior to August 18, 1980, Israel
Pagan listed his property for sale with Century 21 for
the sales price of $44,000.00.

TR.84.

On July 30,

1980, Dorius Black entered into an earnest money
receipt and offer to purchase which provided for
payment of $20,000.00, including $1,000.00 in earnest
money, to be paid to the Plaintiff at closing, and a
deferred payment of $24,000.00, for a total purchase
price of $44,000.00.

The balance of $24,000.00 was to

be deferred for one year with subsequent payments
occurring over the next two year period.

TR.749-750.

The offer was accepted by Mr. Pagan on July 30, 1980.
Although Mr. Black negotiated the purchase of
the home, he never intended to actually buy the home
for himself.

TR.493.

The evidence introduced at

trial showed that on occasion Mr. Black, an independent
businessman, worked with a Joseph Cannon on various
business deals.

The evidence showed that Mr. Black

signed the earnest money agreement with Mr. Pagan as
part of a business arrangement with Mr. Cannon.
TR.492-493.
In a separate transaction, Mr. Black
approached Capitol Thrift about a loan for the purchase
of the home.

TR.495.

Mr. Black did not apply for the

-5loan; Mr. Cannon did. TR.594-595,651.

Along with his

loan application, Mr. Cannon provided financial
statements on himself and for Alpha Leasing Company, a
partnership in which Mr. Cannon held a partnership
interest.

TR.595-596.

Mr. Cannon also signed a

borrower's statement providing that the loan would be
used for strictly business purposes. TR.596.
Based on the value of the home and Mr.
Cannon1s financial strength, the lender agreed to loan
$32,325.00 to Mr. Cannon for the purpose of purchasing
the subject property.

The subject property had an

appraised value of $43,100.00.

The loan officer,

Merlyn Hanks, testified that he normally made loans
with a loan to value ratio at between 65 and 85 percent
and that this $32,325.00 on the Pagan house fell within
this range. TR.611-613.
Although Mr. Cannon did not recall borrowing
money from Capitol Thrift, he testified that he
personally signed the loan application, the escrow
instructions, and the Capitol Thrift promissory note
and trust deed.

TR.583-596.

In fact, Mr. Cannon went

to Capitol Thrift and extended his loan payments on two
separate occasions when the loan became delinquent.
TR.855.
The evidence introduced at trial established
that Capitol Thrift lent money directly to Mr. Cannon,

-6and that Capitol Thrift was not involved in any of the
business arrangements between Mr. Black, Mr. Cannon or
Alpha Leasing.

TR.523-524.

The business arrangement

to purchase the Pagan home was between Mr. Cannon,
Alpha Leasing and Mr. Black.

In factf the loan officer

did not even know who Mr. Pagan was at that time.
TR.860.

The evidence clearly showed that Capitol

Thrift1s involvement was limited to the promissory note
transaction with Mr. Cannon.

TR.860.

On August 18, 1980, the day appointed for
closing, a check in the amount of $32,325.00 was
delivered to Stewart Title with specific instructions
on how and when the check could be negotiated and
the loan proceeds disbursed.

TR.613.

Mr. Cannon

denied endorsing the check, but did acknowledge
receiving disbursements according to the instructions.
TR.575.

The letter of instruction required that title

to the property be in the name of Joseph N. Cannon.
The letter of instruction also provided that a trust
deed in favor of Capitol Thrift was to be recorded as a
first trust deed subject to no other liens or
encumbrances.

In addition, Stewart Title was

instructed to disburse the funds as follows:
(1) $4,848.75 to Capitol Thrift; (2) fees for recording
title and for an insurance policy; and (3) the

-7remainder of the funds to Joseph N. Cannon or as he
directed.

TR.616, 667.
The $4,848.75 represented the balance on a

loan owed by Mr. Black to Capitol Thrift.

The return

of the $4,848.75 to Capitol Thrift to pay off Mr.
Blackfs loan was based on a finderfs fee arrangement.
A fee of this type was normal practice for a lending
institution like Capitol Thrift.

TR.865-866.

Bruce L. Moesser was an Executive Vice
President with Capitol Thrift at the time of the loan
transaction.

TR.863.

to Mr. Cannon.

Mr. Moesser supervised the loan

TR.863.

Mr. Moesser did not know who

Mr. Pagan was at the time of the transaction and did
not see anything unusual about the loan to Mr. Cannon.
TR.863-864, 867.
Scott Peatross, of Bill Brown Realty,
contacted Tommy Sisk of Stewart Title and scheduled the
closing for August 18, 1980.

TR.689.

Mr. Pagan and

his interpreter, Emilio Ortiz, Tommy Sisk of Stewart
Title, Scott Peatross, Joseph Cannon, Dorius Black, and
Jack Rhodes and Vickie Phelps of Century 21 were
present at the closing.

TR.667, 580.

Because of a

delay, Mrs. Phelps left before the closing actually
took place and was replaced by Mr. Rhodes.
718.

TR.750,

-8Tommy W. Sisk was employed by Stewart Title
Company and had 10 years' experience in the title
insurance business.
closing.

TR.663.

He presided over the escrow and

The testimony clearly establishes

that Mr. Sisk conducted the closing in a careful manner
so that Mr. Pagan was able to understand the
transaction through his interpreter.

TR.693.

It was

also shown that Mr. Pagan asked numerous questions
through his interpreter when he did not understand
parts of the transaction.

TR.693.

Mr. Sisk testified

that he explained all of the documentation to Mr.
Pagan, including the fact that Mr. Cannonr not Mr.
Black, was purchasing the property. TR.671.

Mr. Sisk

testified that it was not inconsistent with the terms
of the earnest money agreement to have the substitution
of Mr. Cannon as the buyer of the property. TR.690-691.
It was further explained to Mr. Pagan that
the total amounts of the first and second trust deeds
would exceed the $44,000.00 sales price of the subject
property, and that the trust deed in favor of Capitol
Thrift securing its $32,325.00 promissory note would be
recorded ahead of the trust deed securing the
$24,000.00 note in favor of Mr. Pagan. TR.686, 692-696,
706.

In addition, it was explained to Mr. Pagan that

if Mr. Cannon did not pay for his first mortgage, Mr.
Pagan would have to pay in order to protect his

-9interest.

TR.711.

There was no objection by Mr.

Pagan or his real estate agents to his interest being
secured by a second deed of trust.

TR.713.

Each party

accepted the changes in the real estate transaction.
TR.702, 734, 792.

Mr. Sisk also testified that the

transaction between Capitol Thrift and Mr. Cannon was
totally separate and distinct from Mr. Pagan's
transaction with Mr. Cannon.

TR.714.

The loan to Mr. Cannon for the purchase of
the home was made when Mr. Cannon was in good financial
condition.

TR.857, 860-861.

The terms of the loan

provided for five installments with a balloon payment
for the full amount due in six months.

TR.619.

Such

terms were customary for the type of lender that
Capitol Thrift was, and for the time period in which
the loan was made.

TR.635-636, 863.

The note subsequently came into default
and notices of default were given to Mr. Cannon.

Upon

Mr. Cannon's request, he was granted extensions for
payments on the loan.

TR.637.

The defaults continued,

however, and the property was foreclosed upon with a
deficiency action instituted against Mr. Cannon.
TR.640.
After foreclosure of the home, Mr. Pagan
brought this action.

(Mr. Pagan has since died and his

estate and personal representative have since been

-10substituted as Plaintiffs).

Although alleging a cause

of action against Capitol Thrift in his complaint, Mr.
Pagan testified that he did not claim a cause of action
against Capitol Thrift.

TR.746.

The case was subsequently appealed to this
Court, which referred the case to the Court of Appeals.
After filing an extensive opinion, the Court of Appeals
found that the evidence was insufficient to support
Plaintiffs1 conspiracy theory, and ruled that Captiol
Thrift was not liable for compensatory or punitive
damages.

See Addendum "A".

SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT
The jury's finding that the Appellant
conspired to defraud the Plaintiffs is not supported by
direct or circumstantial evidence which can be
reasonably and naturally inferred.

The verdict was

based solely on suspicion and sympathy for Mr. Pagan.
The Utah Court of Appeals did not err in reversing the
jury verdict.

After viewing the evidence in a light

most favorable to the verdict, the Court found that the
evidence was insufficient to support the verdict
because it was based on conjecture and speculation.

-11-

ARGUMENT
I. THE COURT OF APPEALS WAS CORRECT IN
REVERSING THE JURY VERDICT WHICH WAS NOT
SUPPORTED BY THE EVIDENCE.
The opinion of the Court of Appeals is in
harmony with the accepted and usual course of judicial
proceedings and has prevented the working of an
injustice by reversing a verdict which was not
supported by the evidence.

The Court of Appeals did

not substitute itself into the juryfs role as fact
finder, but gave due deference to the jury's
conclusions.

The Supreme Court has found that an

appellant may successfully attack a jury verdict which
is unsupported by the evidence presented at trial. Von
Hake v.Thomas, 705 P.2d 766, 769 (Utah 1985).

When

the evidence clearly preponderates against the verdict,
the Appellate Court may appropriately reverse the
decision.

Barker v. Dunham, 342 P.2d 867 (Utah 1959);

Metropolitan Investment Co. v. Sine, 376 P.2d 940 (Utah
1962).
This Court, in Groen v. Tri-O-Inc, 667 P.2d
598 (Utah 1983) has outlined the standard of a jury
verdict review when it stated:
It is the exclusive province of a jury
to determine the credibility of the
witnesses, weigh the evidence, and make
findings of fact. Where the evidence is
conflicting and the jury is properly
instructed, we do not upset those

-12findings of fact except upon a showing
that the evidence, viewed in the light
most favorable to the verdict, so
clearly preponderated in Appellant's
favor that reasonable persons could not
differ on the outcome of the case.
(Citation omitted)
See also Von Hake v. Thomas, 705 P.2d 766 (Utah 1985).
The Court of Appeals recognized its
responsibility to view the evidence in a light most
favorable to the verdict and accorded due deference to
the jury as the fact finder.

Pursuant to the

established law concerning the review of a verdict, the
Court of Appeals determined that the evidence did not
support Plaintiff's conspiracy theory.

Clearly the

Court of Appeals did not depart "from the accepted and
usual course of judicial proceedings."

Rule 43, Rules

of the Utah Supreme Court.
In the present case, there is no direct
evidence showing that Capitol Thrift misrepresented a
material fact known to be false.

There is no direct

evidence showing that Capitol Thrift acted for the
purpose of inducing Mr. Pagan to sell his home or that
Mr. Pagan justifiably relied upon Capitol Thrift's
actions.

Since Capitol Thrift did not, by its own

actions, defraud Mr. Pagan or authorize another,
Capitol Thrift's liability can only be established
through some participation in a fraud through a civil
conspiracy.

-13Plaintiff has failed to support a
finding of conspiracy based on the
evidence established at trial.
The Court of Appeals found that to establish
a civil conspiracy allegation one must show that there
was:
(1) a combination of two or more
persons, (2) an object to be
accomplished, (3) a meeting of the minds
on the object or course of action, (4)
one or more unlawful, overt acts, and
(5) damages as a proximate result
thereof. (Citations omitted)
Israel Pagan Estate v. Cannon, 746 P.2d 785, 790 (Utah
App. 1987).
The Utah Supreme Court, in Crane Co. v.
Dahle, 576 P.2d 870 (Utah 1978), set forth the elements
as (1) wrongfully conspiring to violate the plaintiff's
rights, (2) the carrying out of such plan, (3) damages
proximately caused thereby.

Crane Co. at 872. The

plaintiff has the burden of proving civil conspiracy by
clear and convincing evidence.

Crane Co. at 872.

Plaintiffs assert that Dorius Black, Joseph
N. Cannon and Capitol Thrift were working together for
the sole purpose of defrauding Mr. Pagan.

The record

is devoid of evidence establishing that Capitol Thrift
was working with the parties to defraud Mr. Pagan.
The evidence established that, other than the
transaction-concerning the loan to Mr. Cannon, Capitol
Thrift did not participate in any other transaction

-14concerning the purchase of the Pagan home.

In fact,

the evidence introduced at trial clearly established
that the loan officer did not even know who Mr. Pagan
was during this transaction and that Capitol Thrift
entered into a promissory note arrangement directly
with Mr. Cannon for the purchase of the subject
property.

Plaintiffs have failed to produce any

evidence that links the above-named parties together
for a common purpose to defraud.
The Plaintiffs attempt to show a common
purpose by asserting that Mr. Black was employed by
Capitol Thrift to:
"seek out Israel Pagan, a person who is
unable to speak or understand English,
and a person with a sub-normal mental
capacity, for the sole purpose of making
him a party to a well-known real estate
"scam1 through which Pagan was defrauded
out of his home".
TR.493, 497, 498.
(Appellants1 Brief at 20)
This is a blatant attempt to distort the
record to support an unsupported contention. This
distortion is simply one example of Plaintiffs1 many
blatant attempts to do so.
A review of Plaintiffs1 cite shows that
there is no evidence to establish that Mr. Black was
employee of Capitol Thrift.

Mr. Black was never an

employee of Capitol Thrift.

Further, there is no

evidence that Capitol Thrift and Loan used Mr. Black

-15seek out Mr. Pagan for the purpose of entering into a
real estate "scam".

The record clearly establishes

that Capitol Thrift did not even know who Mr. Pagan was
at the time of the transaction.
The Utah Court of Appeals recognized that a
conspiracy theory can be inferred from circumstantial
evidence.

Pagan at 791.

In recognizing the use of

circumstantial evidence, the Appellant Court stated:
To prove conspiracy to defraud by
circumstantial evidence, though, "there
must be substantial proof of
circumstances from which it reasonably
follows, or at least may oe reasonably
inferred, that the conspiracy existed.
It cannot be established by conjecture
and speculation alone". Dill v. Rader
583 P.2d 496, 499 (Okl. 1978)(quoting
Chisler v. Randall, 124 Kan. 278, 259
P.687 (1927).
Pagan at 791.
The Plaintiff has failed to show through
direct or circumstantial evidence that there was a
meeting of the parties1 minds to pursue a course of
action against Mr. Pagan.

Plaintiffs1 theories are

based upon conjecture and speculation.

The evidence

does not establish that the parties were doing anything
other than entering into a normal real estate
transaction.
As stated above, Capitol Thrift and Loan did
not know who Mr. Pagan was at the time of the loan
transaction with Mr. Cannon.

Furthermore, the record

-16clearly shows that Capitol Thrift did not even know of
Mr. Pagan's mental deficiencies prior to the
transaction.

In fact, Plaintiffs1 own expert testified

that a lay person would not be able to tell that Mr.
Pagan was mentally disabled by looking at him.
Plaintiffs' own real estate agents testified that they
felt Mr. Pagan was competent to enter into the
transaction.

TR.731, 754-755.

Plaintiffs also failed to establish that an
unlawful act was performed by Capitol Thrift.

Although

the Plaintiffs do not clearly assert an unlawful act,
they appear to be basing the alleged conspiracy on a
fraud theory.

The Utah Supreme Court has defined fraud

as:
...the making of a false representation
concerning a presently existing material
fact which the representor either knew
to be false or made recklessly without
sufficient knowledge, or the omission of
a material fact when there is a duty to
disclose, for the purpose of inducing
action on the part of the other party,
with actual, justifiable reliance
resulting in damage to the party.
Taylor v. Gasor, Inc., 607 P.2d 293 (Utah 1980).
As with civil conspiracy, The Supreme Court
has held that a finding of fraud must be shown by clear
and convincing proof which is not based on "mere
suspicion or innuendo."

Taylor at 294.

-17A person cannot be liable for fraud unless he
made the representation himself, authorized someone to
make it for him, or participated in some way, such as
through conspiracy.
Fraud 61 (1943).

Pagan at 792 citing 37 C.J.S.

As the Court of Appeals recognized,

"evidence is insufficient if it discloses acts just as
consistent with a lawful purpose as with an unlawful
one."

Pagan at 793, citing Accurate Prods. Inc. v.

Snow, 67 Wash. 2d 416, 408 P.2d 1, 7 (1965); Dill v.
Rader, 583 P.2d 496, 499 (Okla. 1978).
Capitol Thrift recognizes that inferences
play an important role in any finding of fact,
especially in cases such as the instant one.

Infer-

ences, however, must be reasonably and legitimately
drawn.

This is particularly so in cases of fraud.

37 C.J.S. Fraud 115 (1943).

See

Inferences must be made

for the purpose of aiding reason and not to override
it.

They are nothing more than the probable and

natural explanation of the facts.

Holland v. Columbia

Iron Mining Co., 293 P.2d 700 (Utah 1956).
In Holland, the Court was faced with an
appeal of a ruling on summary judgment that there was
no fraudulent conspiracy in a business transaction.
After discussing the issue of inferences, the Court
stated:
Common sense and reason dictate that
evil inferences should not be permitted

-18to be drawn from the routine business
transaction where there are no other
circumstances. To hold otherwise would
throw the door open for attack on each
and every transaction that one might
enter into.
Holland at 702.
In the instant case, the inferences were not
reasonably or legitimately drawn.

The result reached

by the jury is neither a probable nor a natural
explanation of the facts proven.

The evidence does not

support a clear and convincing standard that a
fraudulent activity had taken place to support
Plaintiffs' theory of conspiracy.
The evidence establishes that the transaction
entered into by Capitol Thrift was a lawful and
legitimate transaction in the banking community.
Capitol Thrift had been in contact with Mr. Black, Mr.
Cannon and Mr. Sisk.

These were purely business

contacts.
Mr. Black inquired of the availabiltiy of a
loan to purchase the subject property.

A loan was

extended to Mr. Cannon on the basis of his loan
application and financial statements.

It is

undisputed that Mr. Cannon was in a strong financial
position, which provided the basis for the loan to him.
Contact with Mr. Sisk occurred when the loan
and letter of instructions were delivered to Stewart

-19Title on the day of the closing.

While the lender's

contacts with Mr. Black and Mr. Cannon were before the
date of closing, these contacts occurred after Mr.
Black had negotiated for the purchase of the Pagan
home.

Mr. Black further testified that Capitol Thrift

was not involved in his plans with Mr. Cannon to
purchase the home.

Clearly, these contacts do not even

fall within the realm of a fraudulent transaction.
Capitol Thrift admitted dealing with Mr.
Black on prior occasions.

This fact substantiates Mr.

Cannon's referral for the loan.

One would be

hard-pressed to find that a successful business does
not depend on returning customers.
Capitol Thrift loaned Mr. Cannon $32,325.00
for the purchase of the Pagan home.

Plaintiffs contend

that this was a substantial deviation from Mr. Pagan's
agreement.

Even if this were a deviation, the evidence

does not support that Capitol Thrift knew it.

There

was no limitation on the amount to be borrowed in the
earnest money agreement or any representation that the
amount borrowed on the property would be limited.
Furthermore, the evidence clearly
establishes that all deviations were slowly and clearly
explained to Mr. Pagan through his interpreter.

At

least one of Mr. Pagan's real estate agents was present
during these explanations.

The closing officer even

-20explained the consequences of Capitol Thrift's first
trust deed on the property to Mr. Pagan and his agents.
Capitol Thrift was never notified of any
limitation whatsoever on any liens against it on the
property.

The loan was based on representations made

in Mr. Cannon's loan application and on the value of
the security.

Clearly, Capitol Thrift acted lawfully

in protecting its security for the promissory note.
The letter of instructions which accompanied
the loan check to Stewart Title required that the
title be in the name of Joseph N. Cannon and that
Capitol Thrift be secured by a first trust deed.

This

requirement does not indicate that the lender was
trying to defraud Mr. Pagan out of his property.

It

shows a proper banking procedure by Capitol Thrift to
secure the promissory note.
The letter of instructions also required
$4,848.75 to be paid back to the lender.

The evidence

produced at trial clearly established that a finder's
fee is not an unusual occurrence in the banking
industry.

The testimony of Bruce Moesser, Executive

Vice President of Capitol Thrift and Loan at the time,
established that finder's fees of five to six percent
were not uncommon.
Mr. Pagan was of low intelligence.
doctor testified that this fact could only be

His

-21determined through testing.

His own real estate agents

felt that Mr. Pagan understood and was competent to
enter into the subject transaction.

Even if Mr.

Pagan's mental capacity could be determined by
observation, Capitol Thrift could not have known of the
deficiency since it had never met Mr. Pagan during the
transactions.
At the time of closing, Mr. Cannon was
substituted as buyer.

This substitution was in

accordance with provisions of the earnest money receipt
and offer to purchase.

The substitution was explained

to parties present at the closing.
The trust deed in favor of the lender was
drafted and signed outside the presence of both Mr.
Pagan and his agents.

The funds received from the

lender were also disbursed after the closing had taken
place.

The evidence produced at trial clearly showed

that this was a normal real estate closing practice.
There was no objection to this procedure by Mr. Pagan
or his agents.

In fact, Mr. Rhodes waited around until

the check arrived from the lender, but did not take the
time to review the documentation.
The loan to Mr. Cannon was payable in six
months.

This type of loan was not uncommon for the

type of lending institution that Capitol Thrift was or
for the time period during which the loan was made.

-22This is particularly true in light of the interest rate
at the time of this transaction.
The undisputed testimony clearly showed that
notices of default on Mr. Cannon's loan were sent to
him.

Although the Utah statutues provide for specific

time periods to foreclose real property secured by a
trust deed, Capitol Thrift agreed to extensions on the
payment of the loan by Mr. Cannon.

Clearly, these

extensions do not evidence an intent to immediately
foreclose upon Mr. Pagan1s home as Plaintiffs try to
infer.

In fact, the evidence shows that payments were

made on the loan.
The only inference which can reasonably be
drawn from these facts is that Capitol Thrift was used
by Mr. Black and Mr. Cannon to fund part of a business
venture which ultimately soured.

Any other finding

simply is not reasonable, based on the evidence.

This

is particularly true in light of the fact that Mr.
Pagan himself testified that he did not have a cause of
action against Captiol Thrift.
The fraudulent inferences drawn by the jury
are, at most, suspicion, and suspicion is not enough to
support an inference of fraud.

One may only assume

that the jury used the "deep pocket" theory in awarding
judgment.

Even at that, the suspicions do not

reasonably and naturally follow the facts proven.

The

-23verdict rendered by the jury clearly was an act of
sympathy for Mr. Pagan who was continuously described
as being physically and mentally impaired.

Capitol

Thrift does not assert that sympathy is not warranted
for the Plaintiff, but sympathy should not provide the
basis for a verdict.
II. THE TRIAL COURT ERRED WHEN IT
DENIED THE MOTIONS FOR DIRECTED VERDICT
AND FOR JUDGMENT NOTWITHSTANDING THE
VERDICT.
Capitol Thrift recognizes the right of trial
by jury as one that should be safeguarded by the
courts.

There are, however, circumstances where the

issues of fact should be taken from the jury.

Both the

Utah Supreme Court and the United States Supreme Court
have ruled that the reversal of a judgment on the
ground that the evidence was insufficient to sustain a
verdict does not deny a party of a constitutionally
guaranteed jury trial.

Creamer v. Ogden Union Ry &

Depot Co., 242 P.2d 575, 577-578 (Utah 1952).

This

Court has stated:
The right to have a jury pass upon
issues of fact does not include the
right to have a cause submitted to a
jury in the hope of a verdict where the
facts undisputably show that the
Plaintiff is not entitled to relief.
Raymond v. Union Pac. R. R., 191 P.2d 137, 141 (Utah
1948).

-24This Court has set forth the circumstances
under which the issues of fact should be taken from the
jury,
...in ruling on motions which takes
issues of fact from the jury (this
includes both motions for directed
verdict and judgment notwithstanding the
verdict), the trial court is obligated
to look at the evidence in all
reasonable inferences that fairly may be
drawn therefrom in the light favorable
to the party moved against; and the
granting of such a motion is justified
only if, in so viewing the evidence,
there is substantial basis therein which
would support a verdict in his favor.
Mel Hardman Prod., Inc. v. Robinson, 604 P.2d 913 (Utah
1979); Management Comm. of Graystone Pines Homeowners
Ass'n v. Graystone Pines, Inc., 652 P.2d 896 (Utah
1982) .
In the instant case, the evidence was not
sufficient for the reasons argued above.

As a result,

the Plaintiffs failed to establish a prima facie case
against Capitol Thrift.

The elements of both fraud and

conspiracy were not established by evidence which was
clear and convincing.

Therefore, as a matter of law,

there could not be a finding of conspiracy to defraud
Mr. Pagan and Plaintiffs cause of action must fail.
The result is underscored by the fact that
Mr. Pagan, under oath, testified that he did not make
any claim against Capitol Thrift.

This case should not

have been allowed to go to the jury.

The trial court

was incorrect when it ruled that Capitol Thrift's

-25motions to tajce the case from the jury were resolved by
the return of the jury's verdict.

The jury's verdict

does not change Mr. Pagan's testimony or establish a
prima facie case on behalf of the Plaintiffs.
III. THE COURT ERRED IN INSTRUCTING THE
JURY THAT PUNITIVE DAMAGES CAN BE FOUND
ON A DIFFERENT STANDARD OF PROOF THAN
THE UNDERLYING WRONGFUL ACT COMPLAINED
OF.
Punitive damages are awarded only where the
nature of the wrong goes beyond merely violating the
rights of another.

For an award of punitive damages to

be proper, the wrongful act complained of must be
characterized by some circumstance of aggravation such
as conduct which is willful/ malicious or in knowing or
reckless disregard for the rights of others.

Behrens

v. Raleigh Hills Hospital/ Inc./ 675 P.2d 1179 (Utah
1983).

Leigh Furniture & Carpet Co. v. Isom, 657 P.2d

293 (Utah 1982) .
Even in cases of fraud, punitive damages are
the exception.

The basic elements of fraud, as

indicated above, must be established by clear and
convincing evidence and not by mere suspicion or
innuendo.

Punitive damages may be awarded in such

cases of fraud where there is, in addition to the basic
elements of fraud, "other extraordinary or exceptional
circumstances clearly indicating malice or

-26willfulness."

37 C.J.S. Fraud 144 (1943)(emphasis

added).
In the present case, the trial court
instructed the jury in Instruction No. 21, 26, and 27
that punitive damages could be found from a
preponderance of the evidence that the Defendants1
conduct was willful and malicious in conspiring to
defraud Mr. Pagan.

Since punitive damages are the

exception, even in cases of fraud, the basis for the
award must be found in additional facts above and
beyond the elements of the underlying wrongful act.
Because of this, the standard of proof for the findings
upon which the award of punitive damages is based, must
coincide with the standard of proof necessary for a
finding of the underlying wrongful act.

In this case,

the underlying wrongful act is conspiracy to defraud,
which must be found by clear and convincing evidence.
The Court's use of the preponderance standard in this
instance was, at least, confusing to the jury and, at
most, prejudicial in the jury!s awarding of damages on
the Plaintiffs1 cause of action.

CONCLUSION
For the reasons stated above, it is
respectfully submitted that the decision of the Utah
Court of Appeals should be affirmed.
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GARFF, Judge:
Defendant Capitol Thrift and Loan (Capitol) appeals from a
jury verdict finding it liable to plaintiff Israel Pagan Estate
for damages arising out of Capitol's alleged conspiracy with
defendants Stewart Title Company (Stewart Title) and Joseph
Cannon (Cannon) to defraud Pagan of his home. We reverse.
Pagan, a native of Puerto Rico, is unable to speak or
understand English, and has subnormal mental capacity due to
injuries suffered in an industrial accident• On July 30, 1980,
with the help of his friend and interpreter, Emilio Ortiz, he
listed his heme for sale with Century.21 Real Estate. Ortiz,
with a tenth grade education, was unsophisticated in real
estate transactions.

On occasion, Cannon, who was a partner in defendant Alpha
Leasing, worked with Dorius Black, an independent businessman.
Black, as part of a business arrangement with Cannon, signed an
earnest money agreement with Century 21 on July 30, 19 80, and
executed a $1,000.00 promissory note for the purpose of
purchasing Pagan's home* This earnest money agreement
specified that Black was the purchaser of the home, 1 that he
deposited $1,000.00 earnest money in the form of a promissory
note, and that the purchase price of the house was $44,000.00.
Of this price, $20,000.00 was payable as a down payment at
closing, and the remaining £24,000.00 balance was payable as
follows: payments were to be deferred for the first year; on
August 1, 1981, a $2,530.88 interest payment was due; and on
September 1, 1981, monthly payments of $242*67 were to begin,
which were to be paid until August 1, 1982 when the balance was
to be paid off with a balloon payment.
Stewart Title, acting as the escrow agent for this
transaction, drew up the following documents: an escrow
agreement, a trust deed note for the $24,000.00 balance bearing
the same terms as the earnest money agreement, a request for
reconveyance, copies* of the buyer*s and seller's closingstatements, and a trust deed- Pagan and Cannon each paid
$25.00 to set up this escrow account* nothing in any of these
documents indicated the existence of any other trust deed.
Black, who owed Capitol $4,848.75 at the time, referred
Cannon to Capitol to obtain a loan for the $20,000.00 down
payment. Although Cannon testified that he never actually
applied for or negotiated with Capitol for this loan, Merlyn .. *
Hanks, a loan officer with Capitol, testified that Cannon had
requested such a loan* The record indicates that Cannon filled
out an application with Capitol for a $32,325.00 loan on August
13, 1980, five days prior to the closing; submitted to Capitol
a signed personal financial statement, an Alpha Leasing
financial statement, and a signed borrower's statement that the
loan was to be used for strictly business purposes; and signed
a business promissory note and security agreement for a
$32,325.00 commercial loan from Capitol at 22% interest,
payable in five monthly payments of $568.15, beginning
September 18, 1980, with a balloon payment of $32,518.72 due on
or before February 18, 1981* This loan was to be secured by a
first trust deed against the Pagan property. These documents
were not available to the parties during closing.
1. The earnest money agreement also stated that title to the
property would vest as designated at closing, so another
purchaser could be substituted for Black under the terms of the
agreement.
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Pagan's house was appraised at $43,100•00. Hanks
testified that he normally made loans for between 65 to 85* of
the appraised value of a house, and that the $32,325,00 loan
fell within this range ($23,015.00 to $36,365.00). He also
testified that he was aware that Black and Cannon had a working
relationship, and that Black had referred Cannon to Capitol to
obtain the loan* However, he was unaware of the $24,000.00
agreement between Cannon and Pagan.
Closing was originally scheduled to take place at Stewart
Title on the morning of August 13, 1980. Because the
documentation was not completed, the closing was delayed until
that afternoon. Pagan, Ortiz, Black, and Cannon were present
during the entire two-and-one-half hour afternoon meeting, but
agents from Century 21 and Bill Brown Realty, representing
Pagan and ~the buyers respectively, were only present during
portions of the transaction.
Tommy Sisk, representing Stewart Title, presided over the
closing* He conducted it slowly so that Ortiz # who was
translating for Pagan, would not be rushed. He stated that
Pagan asked him questions about the transactions through Ortiz,
which he answered, that he explained the documentation prepared
by Stewart Title to all the parties, and that he explained to
Pagan the following changes from the earnest money agreement:
the substitution of Cannon for Black as buyer; 2 the existence
of the Capitol trust deed; that the total loan amounts would
exceed the £44,000.00 purchase price of the property; and that
the trust deed in favor of Capitol securing the $32,325.00
commercial note would be recorded ahead of the trust deed in
favor of Pagan which secured the $24,000.00 note. However, he
also stated that he did not know at that time what the exact
amount of the loan from Capitol would b^. He further explained
to Pagan that Pagan would be in a second rather than a first
position, and if Cannon did not pay, Pagan would have to pay on
the Capitol loan to avoid losing his house. Sisk stated that
he went through the entire closing before Pagan executed any
documents. At the end of the closing, the parties signed the
documents and copies were distributed.
The seller's statement of account, naming Pag-an as the
seller and Cannon as the buyer, indicated that the sales price
of the. house was $44,000.00, that there was a d^ed of trust on
2. Black testified that he was not purchasing the home far
"himself, but was purchasing it as part of a business venture
with Cannon, and that the arrangement was between him, Cannon
and Alpha Leasing only.
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the property for $24,000.00, and that the following closing
costs were payable by Pagan from the $20,000.00 down payment:
current taxes of $224.07, a title insurance fee of $211.00, an
escrow fee of $37.50, a sales commission of $2,640.00, and a
closing fee of $30.00. The balance due Pagan was $16,857.43,
which he received.
Sisk stated that he did not review the disbursement
checks, and that Cannon did not sign the note for $32,352.00,
the accompanying trust deed in favor of Capitol, and the
mortgage at the closing because these documents were delivered
efterwards. He also indicated that the transaction between
Bagan and Cannon was totally separate from Cannon's transaction
with Capitol, that he had nothing to do with the transaction
between Capitol and Cannon, that he had no knowledge that the
closing involved Alpha Leasing, and that the substitution of
Black for Cannon was not inconsistent with the terms of the
earnest money agreement. He testified that the transaction did
not close in accordance with the earnest money agreement
because of last minute changes, but that such last minute
changes were common*
The broker representing the buyers3 believed that Black
and Cannon were working together as partners, and that Cannon
was a more qualified buyer than Blacks He understood that
Black was the buyer, and was using Cannon as a guarantor on the
loan, but that, at closing, the parties decided to make Cannon
the buyer of record because Cannon was more qualified and they
did not want to complicate the- transaction further by adding- an.
additional buyer. He stated that he was aware that there would
be a first mortgage ahead of Pagan's trust deed, and that it
would be for more than $20,000.00, but was not aware of the
exact amount or the terms of the Capitol* note.
Cannon testified that he attended the closing at Black1s
request, believing that he was- only to be a guarantor of the
loan- He was induced to do so on the grounds that Black, who
was in arrears on lease payments owed to Alpha Leasing, had
projects which, if funded, might be made sufficiently
profitable to enable him to make the lease payments. During
closing, however, Cannon was substituted for Black as
purchaser, and, consequently, signed the following documents as
3- The broker testified that he did not discuss the
transaction with Capitol or Hanks, that none of the $4,848.75
returned to Capitol~was paid to him, that he did not pay Black
for bringing the transaction to his company, and that he was
not representing Alpha Leasing.
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the only obligor: the trust deed in fivor of Stewart Title for
$24,000.00, the escrow agreement for this trust deed, and a
statement of account naming him as the buyer of the property.
None of these documents indicated that Cannon was a guarantor
rather than the purchaser. Nevertheless, he testified that he
did not know that he was the purchaser, stating that although
he had an opportunity to read the documents, he did not do so.
He also testified that he was not aware that Black had signed
any of the documents.4
The real estate agent representing Pagan at the closing
indicated that he was aware that the $20,000.00 down payment
would be borrowed, but did not know if it would be a first or
second mortgage* He understood, however, that Cannon was
financially stable, and believed that the documentation
prepared by Stewart Title was exactly according to the earnest
money agreement. He stated that he discussed the contents of
the documents with Pagan, and that he was not aware of any
misrepresentation made at the time. However, he never saw the
documents brought over from Capitol after the closing and was
not aware that more than $20,000.00 was to be placed against
the home. He also believed that the terms and conditions had
been significantly altered from the earnest money agreement
because the loan was greater than $20,000.00, and that Pagan
could not have understood the alterations unless they had been
discussed with him when the agent was not present.
After the closing, Hanks brought the $32,325.00 loan check
from Capitol to Stewart Title. This check, jointly payable to
Stewart Title and Cannon, was accompanied by an instruction
letter which directed that acceptance of the check would
guarantee title insurance covering the Pagan property, title
would be in Cannon's name, the trust deed would be the first
recorded, and the funds would be disbursed as follows:
$4,348.75 back to Capitol, recording and title' insurance fees,
and the remainder to Cannon or as he directed.
Cannon and Stewart Title endorsed the Capitol loan check
and deposited it with Stewart Title to be disbursed according
to instructions. Cannon, although his signature appeared on
the back of the check, denied that he had ever seen the check
or that he had endorsed it. From the loan proceeds, $4,848.75
was returned to Capitol, $331.00 was paid out for recording and
4. That Cannon apparently consistently lied about his
involvement in the transaction only goes to the issue of his
credibility, and does not directly support any inference that
Capitol was involved in this transaction as a conspirator.
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title fees, $1,640.00 went to Bill Brown Realty as the buyer*s
share of the real estate commission, and $25,00 went for the
buyer's share of the escrow fee*
Sisk recorded the trust deeds on August 19, 1980,
recording the deed in favor of Capitol ahead of the deed in
favor of Pagan as per Capitol's instructions.
Cannon received a check from Stewart Title for $13,471*57,
representing his share of the proceeds from the Capitol loan*
He deposited this check in the Alpha Leasing account. He
testified that he then paid $1,000.00 earnest money to Bill
Brown Realty, $4,848.75 to Capitol, and the remainder according
to Black's direction, indicating that he received none of these
proceeds personally. Black, however, testified that he did not
receive the proceeds except for the $4,848.75 returned to
Capitol which was applied to his pre-existing debt with Capitol*
Although Cannon testified that he did not recall making
any payments on' the loan personally or through Alpha Leasing, a
$668.15 payment was made on October 14, 19 80 on the $32,325*00
loan.5
Cannon thought Black was going to be making the
payments, but became aware that Black was not doing so when
Capitol contacted Cannon about the loan. Cannon then contacted
Black, who indicated that he would be taking care of the
problem. Black did not make any further payments, however, and
Cannon, whose financial condition had deteriorated
substantially, was not then in a position to make the paymentsCannon personally extended the loan in January, 1981, at
which time a $2,700.00 payment was made. Capitol sent notices
of default to Cannon on the balance of the loan on May 11,
1981, and on September 1, 1981. Capitol *then sold the property
at a trustee's sale for $39,300.00, and initiated an action
against Cannon to recover.the remaining $12,726.53 balance.
At trial, Pagan had no recollection of the transaction.
Ha also had no recollection of listing his home for sale,
selling it, going to Stewart Title for the closing, or even
what had happened to his house. Ortiz testified that he
translated the events but did not understand what was
happening, nor did Pagan. Ortiz stated that there was never
any discussion concerning the $32,325-00 note, and that there
was no discussion concerning the documents that Pagan was
5. Plaintiffs assertion that this payment was made prior to
the August 18, 19 80 closing date is without support in the
record.
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requested to sign* Ultimately/ Pagan received nothing more for
his $44,000,00 equity than the $16,857,43 down payment he
received at closing.
A banking expert associated with Capitol testified that he
had supervised the loan to Cannon and did not see anything
unusual in it* At the time the loan was made/ the prime rate was
between 20 and 21%, first mortgage money was nearly
non-existent, and many people were borrowing with .short-term
"bridge" loans, anticipating that when they matured, they could
arrange for long-term financing. Because Capitol was primarily a
second mortgage lender, many people unable to get first mortgages
came to Capitol during that time for short-tern financing. He
also indicated that it was normal practice for such lending
institutions to pay finder's fees of 2 to 3\, and that such a fee
was paid to Black on the Cannon loan*
The jury concluded that there was clear and convincing
evidence that Cannon, Capitol through Hanks, and Stewart Title
through Sisk, were guilty of conspiracy to defraud Pagan of his
property. It "found Cannon liable for $12,000-00 compensatory and
$4,000.00 punitive damages, Capitol liable for $12,000.00
compensatory and $4,000.00 punitive damages, and Stewart Title
liable for no compensatory and $2,000.00 punitive damages.
Counsel for Pagan argues that the evidence supports a
finding of conspiracy, in which Hanks, Black, and Cannon engaged
in a confidence game to defraud Pagan*6
The sole appellant, Capitol, asserts that the verdict is not
supported by the evidence, but that the evidence indicates a
normal business transaction that unfortunately happened to go
sour.
To prove a civil conspiracy, the plaintiff must show the
following elements: (1) a combination of two or more persons,
(2) an object to be accomplished, (3) a meeting of the minds on
the object or course of action, (4) one or more unlawful, overt
acts, and (5) damages as a proximate result thereof. Citizen
Stats Bank v. Gilmore. 226 Kan. 662, 603 P.2d 605, 613 <1979);
Duffy v. Butte Teachers' Union, 163 Mont. 246, 541 P.2d 1199,

6. Pagan's brief left much to be desired as far as presenting a
coherent statement of the facts and their application to the
legal issues.
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1202 (1975) (quoting ISA C.J-S* Conspiracy §§ l, 2 ) . 7 The
plaintiff must present clear and convincing evidence to carry
his burden of proof on a charge of civil conspiracy. Crane Cnt
v. Dahle, 576 P.2d 870, 872 (Utah 1978).
T 5 II?

Two or Wore Persons and Obiect to be Accomplish*^

Plaintiff asserts the following theory: All persons
involved in this transaction joined in the alleged conspiracy.
Their object was to defraud Pagan, whom they previously knew to
be mentally deficient and, therefore, helpless, by taking his
$44,000,00 property for $16,857.43, each obtaining some of the
profit for himself. Capitol was to immediately receive a
"kick-back- payment of $4,843.75 from Black; later, $39,300.00
from a trustee's sale of the property; and an additional
$32,325.00 from a deficiency judgment against Cannon. Thereby,
it could realize a $76,473*75 return from an initial investment
of $32,325.00. Hanks, Cannon, and Black, immediately after
closing, were to jointly receive $13,471.57 over the agreed
first mortgage- price, while the real estate agents were to
receive exorbitant fees for their services.
Supporting this theory were the facts that Pagan only
received $16,857.43 from the transaction, that $4,848.75 was,
indeed, paid to Capitol immediately after the transaction took
place, and that Capitol ultimately received $39,300,00 from the
trustee's sale of the property.
However, the record also
indicates that Capitolfs deficiency action was for only
$12,726.58. The difference between the original principal
amount and the amount Capitol attempted to recover was accrued
interest at 22%. Further, the record does not indicate that
Hanks received any proceeds from the $13,471.57 loan, but that
the loan was disbursed to Cannon, and fails to indicate why
Cannon would enter into such an unfavorable agreement. Thus,
we find that there is no clear and convincing 'evidence that the
parties' evil object was to defraud Pagan.
7. Utah has no civil conspiracy statute, as such, but it is
well settled that such an offense exists at common law. The
criminal conspiracy statute, Utah Code Ann. § 76-4-201 (1937),
requires a showing of substantially similar elements: (1)
intention that the conduct constituting a crime be performed,
(2) agreement between two or more persons to engage in or
cause the criminal conduct, and (3) commission of an overt act
in pursuance of the conspiracy by any one of the conspirators*
A civil action further requires that there be damage as a
proximate result of the conspiracy. Duffy, 541 P.2d at 1202.
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ITT.

A Meeting of the Minds -

There is no direct evidence in the record of a meeting of
the parties1 minds with respect to defrauding Pagan of his
property* However, it is not necessary in a civil fraud action
to prove that the parties actually came together and entered
into a formal agreement to do the acts complained of by direct
evidence* Holmes v. McKev, 383 P.2d 655, 665 <Okla. 1962).
Instead, conspiracy may be inferred from circumstantial
evidence, including the nature of the act done, the relations
of the parties, and the interests of the alleged conspirators.
Wratt v. Union Mortgage Co,, 24 Cal. 3d 773, 598 P.2d 45, 51-52
157 Cal* Rptr. 392 (1979); Chicago Title Ins. Co, v, Great
Astern Fin, Corp.. 69 Cal. 2d 305, 444 P.2d 481, 488, 70 Cal.
.Rptr. 849 (1968). To prove conspiracy to defraud by
circumstantial evidence, though, "there must be substantial
proof of circumstances from which it reasonably follows, or at
least may be reasonably inferred, that the conspiracy existed.
It cannot be established by conjecture and speculation alone.Pill' v. -RatJer. 583 P.2d 496, 499 (Okla. 1978) (quoting ChislSI
v. Randall* 124 Kan* 278, 259 P* 687 (1953))*
The act in question is a real estate transaction,- which
normally requires the services of real estate agents, loan
companies, title companies, and the existence of a buyer and
seller* Such parties were present in this transaction*
The record clearly indicates that Black and Cannon, the
buyers, were working together and that Hanks and the real
estate agents were aware of that relationship* Stewart Title
drew up all the documents except those prepared by Capitol.
Black had a prior relationship with Capitol, including a
$4,848.75 debt, which he paid off with proceeds from the
$32,325.00:loan. Capitol required Stewatt Title to pay back
the $4,848.75 sum, to record its interest in the Pagan property
first, and to disburse the proceeds of the loan to Cannon*
Sisk, of Stewart Title, recorded Capitol's trust de&l prior to
Pagan's, pursuant to Capitol's instructions. The record
indicates that the parties did not know of Pagan's mental
infirmity prior to the transaction, but met Pagan for the first
time at the closing. Pagan's expert witness, Dr* William
Barrett, testified that a lay person would not be able to tell
that Pagan was mentally disabled by looking at him*,'
Plaintiff asserts that these facts adequately support the
inference that Hanks, Black, and Cannon engaged in a confidence
game to defraud Pagan, whom they previously knew to be mentally
deficient, of his property, indicating that the parties had a
meeting of the minds on the object of the conspiracy*
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However, not only does the evidence directly contradict
plaintiff's desired inference that the conspirators knew about
Pagan's mental deficiency prior to the transaction but the
other facts do not necessarily or even reasonably lead to the
inference that the parties were doing anything but engaging in
a normal real estate transaction. Specifically, uncontroverted
evidence was presented#at trial that finder's fee arrangements
were normal banking practice for this type of loan, as was
Capitol's requirement of taking a first trust deed against the
property. Further, the record indicates that Stewart Title was
not aware of the details of the Capitol loan prior to the
transaction. Thus, the evidence does not provide anything more
substantial than conjecture and speculation to show the
existence of a conspiratorial relationship between the parties.
IV.

Unlawful Act

To assert civil conspiracy/ the plaintiff must also prove
that the alleged conspirators performed one or more unlawful,
overt acts. If the object of the alleged conspiracy or the
means used to attain it is lawful, even if damage results to
the plaintiff or the* defendant acted with a malicious motive,
there can be no civil action for conspiracy. "If such were not
the rule, obviously many purely business dealings would give
rise to an action in tort on behalf of one who may have been
adversely affected." Duffy. 541 P.2d at 1202.
'." Plaintiff's brief suggests that the allegedly unlawful
overt act at issue is fraud. The Utah Supreme Court, in Tavlor
v. Gasor. Inc. . 607 P.2d 293, 294 (Utah. 1980), defines fraud as:
the making of a false representation
concerning a presently existing material
fact which the representor either knew to
be false or made recklessly without
sufficient knowledge, or the omission of a
material fact when there is a duty to
disclose, for the purpose of inducing
action on the part of the other party,
with actual, justifiable reliance
resulting in damage to that party.
A person cannot be liable for fraud unless he made the
false representations himself, authorized someone to make them
for him, or participated in the misrepresentation in some way,
such as through a conspiracy. 37 C-2.S+ Fraud § 61 (1943),
There is no direct evidence in the present case that Capitol
misrepresented a material fact known to be false. Nor is there
direct evidence that Capitol acted for the purpose of inducing
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Pagan to sell his home or that Pagan relied upon Capitol's
actions. Since Capitol did not, by its own- actions, defraud
Pagan or authorize another to do so, Capitol's liability can only
be established by proving that it was engaged in a conspiracy to
defraud. However, the evidence shows that, other than providing
financing, Capitol did not participate in Black's plan to
purchase the home.8
Plaintiff argues that the evidence supports the following
inferences: Hanks and Capitol were fully aware that the
"notorious- real estate promoter, Black, was acting in concert
with Cannon, whom they knew at the time to be a judgment-proof
•straw man" unable to repay a $32,325.00 loan at 22%. They also
knew that Black and Cannon had never requested or applied for a
loan. Nevertheless, Capitol drafted the note and the first trust
deed in Cannon's name without.considering the $44,000.00 sales
price of the property and disregarded the $24,000.00 mortgage, of
which Hanks was fully aware, between Pagan and Cannon. At the
closing, judgment-proof Cannon was switched for Black as the
buyer, while Hanks deliberately concealed the terms of the
$32,325.00 loan from Pagan during the closing by delivering the
loan documents to Stewart Title prior to the closing, but not
disclosing them until after the closing was completed and the
parties had left. The promoters, Cannon and Black, refused to
make any payments on the $32,325.00 note or on the $24,000.00
contract, knowing that the trust deed on the $32,325.00 note
would be foreclosed long before the due date on the $24,000.00
contract, and that because they were judgment-proof anyway, they
would not be required to repay the loan. Furthermore, the entire
transaction was financed entirely out of Pagan's equity, while
the other parties received all the benefits without paying for
them.
8. "[I]t is not sufficient that the circumstances lead to a
mere suspicion of fraud, nor are they sufficient where they are
as consistent with honesty and good faith as with fraud
(footnote omitted). When the proved or admitted facts are
consistent with any reasonable theory of good faith and honest
intent, they should be so construed (footnote omitted). Fraud
cannot be inferred or presumed from ambiguous evidence (footnote
omitted). * - • When it is sought to prove fraud by
circumstantial evidence, the fraud must be such as would
reasonably and naturally follow from the circumstances so
proved, and fraud will not be lightly inferred (footnote
omitted). The collateral facts from which the inference of
fraud is sought to be drawn must be proved precisely as facts
are proved in other cases (footnote omitted). Presumptions of
fact from presumptions are not sufficient." 37 C.J.S. fiaiisl
§ 115 (1943).
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The plaintiff has the burden of presenting clear and
convincing evidence supporting his conspiracy theory. Dill.
533 P.2d at 499; Crane v. Dahle, 576 P.2d 870, 872 (Utah
1978). This evidence must do more tha^ merely raise a
suspicion — it must lead to belief that the conspiracy
SSlStefl. Dill/ 533 P.2d at 499 (emphasis in original) . Such
evidence is sufficient.if it shows that the circumstances are
consistent only with the existence of a conspiracy, John Davis
and Co, v. Cedar Glen No. Four, Inc.. 75 Wash. 2d 241# 450 P.2d
166, 172 (1969). Evidence is insufficient if it discloses acts
just as consistent with a lawful purpose as with an unlawful
one. Accurate Products, Inc. v. Snow, 67 Wash. 2d 416, 408
P.2d 1, 7 (1965); Dill, 583 P.2d at 499. 9 -Common sense and
reason dictate that evil inferences should not be permitted to
be drawn from routine business transactions where there are no
other transactions. To hold otherwise would throw the door
open for an attack on each and every transaction that one might
enter into.* Holland v, Columbia Iron Mining Co.. 4 Utah 2d
303, 293 P.2d 700, 702 (1956). Evidence, viewed in the light
most favorable to the verdict, "disregarding evidence and
inferences to the contrary," is, therefore, considered as a
whole to determine whether the alleged conspirators were
actually united in a scheme to defraud the plaintiff. Morris
v, Dodae Country, Inc.. 89 N.M. 491, 513 P.2d 1273, 1274 (1983).
We accord due deference to the jury as
do not substitute ourselves in this role.
appellant may successfully attack a jury's
•[marshalling] all the evidence supporting

the fact finder and
However, an
verdict by
the verdict and then

9-. T a c t s of trifling importance when considered separately,
or slight circumstances trivial and inconclusive in themselves,
may afford clear evidence of fraud when considered in
connection with each other. It has been said ~that in most
cases fraud can be made out only by a concatenation of
circumstances, many of which in themselves amount to very
little, but in connection with others make a strong case."
Holmes v. McKev, 383 P.2d 655, 666 (Okla. 1963) (citing
Griffith v. Scott. 128 Okla. 125, 261 P. 371 (1927)). However,
•[wlhere subsequent acts are relied upon to establish a
conspiracy, they must clearly indicate the prior collusive
combination and fraudulent purpose and must warrant the
conclusion that the subsequent acts were done in furtherance of
the unlawful combination and in pursuance of the fraudulent
scheme. Disconnected circumstances, anv one of which, or all
of which, are iust as consistent with a lawful purpose as with
an unlawful undertaking, are^insufficient to establish a
conspiracy (emphasis in original).- Dill, 583 P.2d at 499.
(quoting Ballantine v, Cumminas. 220 Pa. 621, 70 A. 546, 547.)
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[demonstrating] that# even viewing the evidence- in the light
most favorable to that verdict, the evidence is' insufficient to
support it." Von Hake v. Thomas, 705 P.2d 756, 769 (Utah 1985).
In the present case, the facts viewed as a whole not only
do not compel an inference of conspiracy, but directly
contradict plaintiff's conspiracy theory in many respects:
First, Black's "notorious* reputation, with which Hanks was
supposedly familiar, is unsupported by the record. Documentary
evidence discloses that Cannon, rather than being judgmentproof at the time of the transaction, was in a strong financial
position, but his fortunes reversed, making him judgment-proof
at the time of trial* Despite Cannon's assertions to the
contrary, documentary evidence indicates that he did, in fact,
personally apply for the loan with Capitol, and that the loan
was granted on the basis of his then financial strength. The
amount of the loan was not made in total disregard of the value
of Pagan*s property, but was well within xeasonable limits (65
to 85* of the appraised value of the property) . The
substitution of Cannon for Black was not only within the terms
of the earnest money, agreement, which directed that the name in
which title would be vested would be designated at the time of
closing, but was fully disclosed to Pagan, and was made on the
basis of Cannon's relative financial strength as compared to
Black's* Furthermore, it is uncontroverted that Hanks
delivered the loan documents to Stewart Title after, not, as
plaintiff's attorney alleges, before the closing; that the
parties were aware of the loan's existence, approximate amount,
and priority; and that Pagan had been informed of it.
The purchasers did, indeed, have some equity in the
property and did, in fact, make efforts to repay the loan.
Documentary evidence indicates that Cannon paid $1,000-00
earnest money directly from the loan proceeds, and personally
extended the loan when it went into default. Ah unidentified
person made a $2,700.00 payment on the loan pursuant to its
being extended. Finally, the record shows that while Pagan
paid closing costs customarily paid for by the seller, Cannon
paid the closing costs customarily paid for by the buyer from
his loan proceeds. Thus, many of the inferences upon which
plaintiff relies to prove his fraud charge are totally
unfounded because they are directly contradicted by
uncontroverted evidence. Therefore, to adapt plaintiff's
theory, the jury's finding would have to be based on conjecture
and speculation.
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Finally, to assert a claim for civil conspiracy, the
plaintiff must show that he sustained damage as a proximate
result of the conspiracy's activities because the conspiracy
itself is not what gives rise to the right to action, but the
torts committed in the furtherance of the conspiracy. Duffy,
541 P.2d at 1202; Chicago Title Ins. Co.. 444 P.2d at 433.
Plaintiff asserts that Pagan was damaged by losing
$27,147.57 as a result of this transaction because he received
only $15,857.43 in exchange for his $44,000.00 equity. Pagan
sustained damage• However, because plaintiff has not shown
sufficient evidence to reasonably imply
the existence of a
conspiracy, he cannot say that Paganfs loss was caused by the
alleged conspiracy.
The purpose of a civil conspiracy action is to connect
participating members in a transaction who otherwise would not
be liable to the plaintiff* Puffy- 541 P.2d at 1202. Because
Cannon, against whom'Pagan could legitimately have a right of
action, is judgment-proof, plaintiff's presumed purpose in
arguing a conspiracy theory against Capitol is to obtain a
judgment payable from Capitol's resources. However, even
though the results of this transaction are unfortunate and
possibly unfair, we find that there is insufficient evidence to
support the jury's finding that Capitol acted together with
Cannon in a conspiracy to defraud Israel Pagan. Therefore, we
reverse and remand for proceedings consistent with this opinion.
Because we do not find sufficient evidence to support
plaintiff's conspiracy theory, Capitol is not liable for
compensatory and punitive damages. Therefore, it is not
necessary to address the issue of punitive damages.

Regnal W. Garff, Judge
I CONCUR:

Norman H. Jackson, Judge
I CONCUR IN RESULT ONLY:

Russell W. Bench, Judge
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is known by) the same name as that
appearing on the extradition papers.
When the state has made its prima
facie case, the petitioner has the burden
of going forward with affirmative evidence that he is not the person named in
the extradition papers. Where the petitioner does this by sworn testimony or by
a verified pleading and where the state
provides no evidence in addition to its
bare prima facie case (as defined above)
to corroborate the petitioner's identity
with the person named in the extradition
papers, the petitioner is entitled to release.
(Emphasis added; citations omitted.)
[1] In the instant case, the State
presented its prima facie case against
Topp, who then had the burden of going
forward with affirmative evidence, not with
a bare allegation that he was not the person sought. To meet his burden that he
was not a fugitive from justice, i.e., that he
was not in the demanding state on the date
of the crime or that he was not the person
named in the extradition warrant, Topp had
to do so by clear and convincing evidence.
Emig v. Hayward, 703 P.2d at 1051 (citing
Langley v. Hayward, 656 P,2d at 1022).
The trial court found that the documentation, together with the testimony of the
sheriff, provided sufficient identification
for extradition. In light of Topp's utter
failure to make more than naked allegations of mistaken identity, the court's finding was clearly not erroneous and will
therefore be upheld by this Court Utah
R.Civ.P. 52(a); State v. Ashe, 745 P.2d
1255 (Utah 1987); State v. Walker, 743
P.2d 191 (Utah 1987).
[2] Topp's argument that the photo
spread shown to the victim and his mother
may have been suggestive is not properly
raised in a habeas corpus hearing. The
cases cited by Topp address the guilt or
innocence of a defendant in a trial setting
and are inapposite here. Beyond establishing the identity of the person held as the
person charged with the crime, neither the
governor of the holding state nor a judge
in a habeas corpus hearing may inquire

into the guilt or innocence of the accused.
Utah Code Ann. § 77-30-20 (1982).
Affirmed.
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ISRAEL PAGAN ESTATE and Leonor
C. Pagan, Personal Representative,
Plaintiff and Respondent,
v.

Joseph N. CANNON, Dorius Black, Alpha
Leasing Company, a partnership; Robert D. Apgood, Joseph N. Cannon, Dorius Black, and Richard McKean, doing
business under the name and style of
Alpha Leasing Company; Bill Brown
Realty, Incorporated; Scott Peatross,
personally; Stewart Title Company of
Utah; Tommy W. Sisk; Capitol Thrift
and Loan, a financial corporation; and
Merlyn Hanks, Defendants and Appellant
No. 860072-CA.
Court of Appeals of Utah.
Nov. 16, 1987.
Rehearing Denied Dec. 2, 1987.
Vendor's estate brought action
against, among others, purchaser's lender,
alleging civil conspiracy to defraud vendor
of his home. The Third District Court, Salt
Lake County, J. Dennis Frederick, J., entered judgment on jury verdict in favor of
vendor's estate, and lender appealed. The
Court of Appeals, Garff, J., held that evidence was insufficient to support civil conspiracy claim.
Reversed
Bench, J., concurred in result only.
1. Conspiracy $»1
To prove civil conspiracy, plaintiff
must show combination of two or more
persons, object to be accomplished, meeting
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of minds on object or course of action, one
or more unlawful, overt acts, and damages
as a proximate result of such conduct
2. Conspiracy <£»19
Evidence did not establish that purchaser's lender, whose $20,000 loan for
down payment for purchase of home was
secured by first deed of trust on home,
engaged in conspiracy with purchaser and
various other individuals to defraud vendor
of his home, even though vendor received
approximately $16,000 for his $44,000 equity in his home, and even though lender
received almost $5,000 following sale transaction.
3. Conspiracy <3=>19
In civil action involving conspiracy to
defraud, it is not necessary to prove by
direct evidence that parties actually came
together and entered into formal agreement to do acts complained of, and conspiracy may be inferred from circumstantial
evidence, including nature of act done, relations of parties, and interest of alleged
conspirators.
4. Conspiracy <3=»19
Circumstantial evidence did not support vendor's claim that purchaser's lender,
whose $20,000 loan for down payment for
purchase of home was secured by first
deed of trust on home, as well as purchaser, title company, and various others,
worked together to defraud vendor of his
home, even though vendor received only
approximately $16,000 for his $44,000 equity in his home and even though vendor
alleged that sale negotiations took place
despite knowledge of parties involved that
vendor did not speak English and was mentally deficient
5. Conspiracy <s»3, 4
There can be no civil action for conspiracy if object of alleged conspiracy or means
used to attain it is lawful, even if damage
results to plaintiff or even if defendant
acted with malicious motive.
6. Fraud <s=>30
Person cannot be held liable for fraud
unless he made false representations himself, authorized someone to make them for

him, or participated in misrepresentation in
some way, such as through a conspiracy.
7. Conspiracy <£»19
Evidence was insufficient to establish
that purchaser's lender, whose $20,000 loan
for down payment for purchase of home
was secured by first deed of trust on home,
either made any material misrepresentation
or acted for purpose of inducing vendor to
sell home so as to support vendor's claim
that lender and others engaged in conspiracy to defraud him of his home.
8* Conspiracy <s=>6
To assert claim for civil conspiracy,
plaintiff must show that he sustained damage as proximate result of conspiracy's activities, because conspiracy itself is not
what gives rise to right to action, but torts
committed in furtherance of conspiracy.
Kay M. Lewis, Salt Lake City, for appellant
Mark S. Miner, Salt Lake City, for respondent
Before BENCH, GARFF and
JACKSON, JJ.
OPINION
GARFF, Judge:
Defendant Capitol Thrift and Loan (Capitol) appeals from a jury verdict finding it
liable to plaintiff Israel Pagan Estate for
damages arising out of Capitol's alleged
conspiracy with defendants Stewart Title
Company (Stewart Title) and Joseph Cannon (Cannon) to defraud Pagan of his
home. We reverse.
Pagan, a native of Puerto Rico, was unable
to speak or understand English, and had
subnormal mental capacity due to injuries
suffered in an industrial accident On July
30, 1980, with the help of his friend and
interpreter, Emilio Ortiz, he listed his home
for sale with Century 21 Real Estate. Ortiz, with a tenth grade education, was unsophisticated in real estate transactions.
On occasion, Cannon, who was a partner
in defendant Alpha Leasing, worked with

i A LEA v. v//u^i^\srt
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Dorius Black, an independent businessman.
Black, as part of a business arrangement
with Cannon, signed an earnest money
agreement with Century 21 on July 30,
1980, and executed a $1,000.00 promissory
note for the purpose of purchasing Pagan's
home. This earnest money agreement
specified that Black was the purchaser of
the home,1 that he deposited $1,000.00 earnest money in the form of a promissory
note, and that the purchase price of the
house was $44,000.00. Of this price, $20,000.00 was payable as a down payment at
closing, and the remaining $24,000.00 balance% was payable as follows: payments
were to be deferred for the first year; on
August 1, 1981, a $2,630.88 interest payment was due; and on September 1, 1981,
monthly payments of $242.67 were to begin, which were to be paid until August 1,
1982 when the balance was to be paid off
with a balloon payment.
Stewart Title, acting as the escrow agent
for this transaction, drew up the following
documents: an escrow agreement, a trust
deed note for the $24,000.00 balance bearing the same terms as the earnest money
agreement, a request for reconveyance,
copies of the buyer's and seller's closing
statements, and a trust deed. Pagan and
Cannon each paid $25.00 to set up this
escrow account Nothing in any of these
documents indicated the existence of any
other trust deed.
Black, who owed Capitol $4,848.75 at the
time, referred Cannon to Capitol to obtain a
loan for the $20,000.00 down payment Although Cannon testified that he never actually applied for or negotiated with Capitol
for this loan, Merlyn Hanks, a loan officer
with Capitol, testified that Cannon had requested such a loan. The record indicates
that Cannon filled out an application with
Capitol for a $32,325.00 loan on August 13,
1980, five days prior to the closing; submitted to Capitol a signed personal financial statement, an Alpha Leasing financial
statement, and a signed borrower's state1. The earnest money agreement also stated that
title to the property would vest as designated at
closing, so another purchaser could be substituted for Black under the terms of the agreement.

ment that the loan was to be used for
strictly business purposes; and signed a
business promissory note and security
agreement for a $32,325.00 commercial
loan from Capitol at 22% interest, payable
in five monthly payments of $668.15, beginning September 18, 1980, with a balloon
payment of $32,518.72 due on or before
February 18, 1981. This loan was to be
secured by a first trust deed against the
Pagan property. These documents were
not available to the parties during closing.
Pagan's house was appraised at $43,100.00. Hanks testified that he normally
made loans for between 65 to 85% of the
appraised value of a house, and that the
$32,325.00 loan fell within this range ($28,015.00 to $36,365.00). He also testified
that he was aware that Black and Cannon
had a working relationship, and that Black
had referred Cannon to Capitol to obtain
the loan. However, he was unaware of the
$24,000.00 agreement between Cannon and
Pagan.
Closing was originally scheduled to take
place at Stewart Title on the morning of
August 18, 1980. Because the documentation was not completed, the closing was
delayed until that afternoon. Pagan, Ortiz,
Black, and Cannon were present during the
entire two-and-one-half hour afternoon
meeting, but agents from Century 21 and
Bill Brown Realty, representing Pagan and
the buyers respectively, were only present
during portions of the transaction.
Tommy Sisk, representing Stewart Title,
presided over the closing. He conducted it
slowly so that Ortiz, who was translating
for Pagan, would not be rushed. He stated
that Pagan asked him questions about the
transactions through Ortiz, which he answered, that he explained the documentation prepared by Stewart Title to all the
parties, and that he explained to Pagan the
following changes from the earnest money
agreement the substitution of Cannon for
Black as buyer; * the existence of the Capi2. Black testified that he was not purchasing the
home for himself, but was purchasing it as part
of a business venture with Cannon, and that the
arrangement was between him, Cannon and Alpha Leasing only.
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tol trust deed; that the total loan amounts
would exceed the $44,000.00 purchase price
of the property; and that the trust deed in
favor of Capitol securing the $32,325.00
commercial note would be recorded ahead
of the trust deed in favor of Pagan which
secured the $24,000.00 note. However, he
also stated that he did not know at that
time what the exact amount of the loan
from Capitol would be. He further explained to Pagan that Pagan would be in a
second rather than a first position, and if
Cannon did not pay, Pagan would have to
pay on the Capitol loan to avoid losing his
house. Sisk stated that he went through
the entire closing before Pagan executed
any documents. At the end of the closing,
the parties signed the documents and copies were distributed.
The seller's statement of account, naming Pagan as the seller and Cannon as the
buyer, indicated that the sales price of the
house was $44,000.00, that there was a
deed of trust on the property for $24,000.00, and that the following closing costs
were payable by Pagan from the $20,000.00
down payment current taxes of $224.07, a
title insurance fee of $211.00, an escrow
fee of $37.50, a sales commission of
$2,640.00, and a closing fee of $30.00. The
balance due Pagan was $16,857,43, which
he received.
Sisk stated that he did not review the
disbursement checks, and that Cannon did
not sign the note for $32,352.00, the accompanying trust deed in favor of Capitol, and
the mortgage at the closing because these
documents were delivered afterwards. He
also indicated that the transaction between
Pagan and Cannon was totally separate
from Cannon's transaction with Capitol,
that he had nothing to do with the transaction between Capitol and Cannon, that he
had no knowledge that the closing involved
Alpha Leasing, and that the substitution of
Black for Cannon was not inconsistent with
the terms of the earnest money agreement
3. The broker testified that he did not discuss the
transaction with Capitol or Hanks, that none of
the $4,848.75 returned to Capitol was paid to
him, that he did not pay Black for bringing the
transaction to his company, and that he was not
representing Alpha Leasing.

He testified that the transaction did not
close in accordance with the earnest money
agreement because of last minute changes,
but that such last minute changes were
common.
The broker representing the buyers8 believed that Black and Cannon were working
together as partners, and that Cannon was
a more qualified buyer than Black. He
understood that Black was the buyer, and
was using Cannon as a guarantor on the
loan, but that, at closing, the parties decided to make Cannon the buyer of record
because Cannon was more qualified and
they did not want to complicate the transaction further by adding an additional buyer. He stated that he was aware that
there would be a first mortgage ahead of
Pagan's trust deed, and that it would be
for more than $20,000.00, but was not
aware of the exact amount or the terms of
the Capitol note.
Cannon testified that he attended the
closing at Black's request, believing that he
was only to be a guarantor of the loan. He
was induced to do so on the grounds that
Black, who was in arrears on lease payments owed to Alpha Leasing, had projects
which, if funded, might be made sufficiently profitable to enable him to make the
lease payments. During closing, however,
Cannon was substituted for Black as purchaser, and, consequently, signed the following documents as the only obligor the
trust deed in favor of Stewart Title for
$24,000.00, the escrow agreement for this
trust deed, and a statement of account
naming him as the buyer of the property.
None of these documents indicated that
Cannon was a guarantor rather than the
purchaser. Nevertheless, he testified that
he did not know that he was the purchaser,
stating that although he had an opportunity to read the documents, he did not do so.
He also testified that he was not aware
that Black had signed any of the documents.4
4. That Cannon apparently consistently lied
about his involvement in the transaction only
goes to the issue of his credibility, and does not
directly support any inference that Capitol was
involved in this transaction as a conspirator.
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The real estate agent representing Pagan at the closing indicated that he was
aware that the $20,000.00 down payment
would be borrowed, but did not know if it
would be a first or second mortgage. He
understood, however, that Cannon was financially stable, and believed that the documentation prepared by Stewart Title was
exactly according to the earnest money
agreement. He stated that he discussed
the contents of the documents with Pagan,
and that he was not aware of any misrepresentation made at the time. However, he
never saw the documents brought over
from Capitol after the closing and was not
aware that more than $20,000.00 was to be
placed against the home. He also believed
that the terms and conditions had been
significantly altered from the earnest money agreement because the loan was greater
than $20,000.00, and that Pagan could not
have understood the alterations unless they
had been discussed with him when the
agent was not present
After the closing, Hanks brought the
$32,325.00 loan check from Capitol to Stewart Title. This check, jointly payable to
Stewart Title and Cannon, was accompanied by an instruction letter which directed
that acceptance of the check would guarantee title insurance covering the Pagan property, title would be in Cannon's name, the
trust deed would be the first recorded, and
the funds would be disbursed as follows:
$4,848.75 back to Capitol, recording and
title insurance fees, and the remainder to
Cannon or as he directed.
Cannon and Stewart Title endorsed the
Capitol loan check and deposited it with
Stewart Title to be disbursed according to
instructions. Cannon, although his signature appeared on the back of the check,
denied that he had ever seen the check or
that he had endorsed it From the loan
proceeds, $4,848.75 was returned to Capitol, $331.00 was paid out for recording and
title fees, $1,640.00 went to Bill Brown
Realty as the buyer's share of the real
estate commission, and $25.00 went for the
buyer's share of the escrow fee.
5. Plaintiffs assertion that this payment was
made prior to the August 18, 1980 closing date
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Sisk recorded the trust deeds on August
19, 1980, recording the deed in favor of
Capitol ahead of the deed in favor of Pagan
as per Capitol's instructions.
Cannon received a check from Stewart
Title for $13,471.57, representing his share
of the proceeds from the Capitol loan. He
deposited this check in the Alpha Leasing
account He testified that he then paid
$1,000.00 earnest money to Bill Brown Realty, $4,848.75 to Capitol, and the remainder according to Black's direction, indicating that he received none of these proceeds
personally. Black, however, testified that
he did not receive the proceeds except for
the $4,848.75 returned to Capitol which was
applied to his pre-existing debt with Capitol.
Although Cannon testified that he did
not recall making any payments on the loan
personally or through Alpha Leasing, a
$668.15 payment was made on October 14,
1980 on the $32,325.00 loan.5 Cannon
thought Black was going to be making the
payments, but became aware that Black
was not doing so when Capitol contacted
Cannon about the loan. Cannon then contacted Black, who indicated that he would
be taking care of the problem. Black did
not make any further payments, however,
and Cannon, whose financial condition had
deteriorated substantially, was not then in
a position to make the payments.
Cannon personally extended the loan in
January 1981, at which time a $2,700.00
payment was made. Capitol sent notices of
default to Cannon on the balance of the
loan on May 11, 1981, and on September 1,
1981. Capitol then sold the property at a
trustee's sale for $39,300.00, and initiated
an action against Cannon to recover the
remaining $12,726.58 balance.
At trial, Pagan had no recollection of the
transaction. He also had no recollection of
listing his home for sale, selling it, going to
Stewart Title for the closing, or even what
had happened to his house. Ortiz testified
that he translated the events but did not
is without support in the record.
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understand what was happening, nor did
Pagan. Ortiz stated that there was never
any discussion concerning the $32,325.00
note, and that there was no discussion concerning the documents that Pagan was requested to sign. Ultimately, Pagan received nothing more for his $44,000.00 equity than the $16,857.43 down payment he
received at closing.
A banking expert associated with Capitol
testified that he had supervised the loan to
Cannon and did not see anything unusual
in it At the time the loan was made, the
prime rate was between 20 and 21%, first
mortgage money was nearly non-existent,
and many people were borrowing with
short-term "bridge" loans, anticipating that
when they matured, they could arrange for
long-term financing. Because Capitol was
primarily a second mortgage lender, many
people unable to get first mortgages came
to Capitol during that time for short-term
financing. He also indicated that it was
normal practice for such lending institutions to pay finder's fees of 2 to 3%, and
that such a fee was paid to Black on the
Cannon loan.
The jury concluded that there was clear
and convincing evidence that Cannon, Capitol through Hanks, and Stewart Title
through Sisk, were guilty of conspiracy to
defraud Pagan of his property. It found
Cannon liable for $12,000.00 compensatory
and $4,000.00 punitive damages, Capitol liable for $12,000.00 compensatory and
$4,000.00 punitive damages, and Stewart
Title liable for no compensatory and
$2,000.00 punitive damages.
Counsel for Pagan argues that the evidence supports a finding of conspiracy, in
which Hanks, Black, and Cannon engaged
in a confidence game to defraud Pagan.1
The sole appellant, Capitol, asserts that
the verdict is not supported by the evi6. Pagan's brief left much to be desired as far as
presenting a coherent statement of the facts and
their application to the legal issues.
7. Utah has no civil conspiracy statute, as such,
but it is well settled that such an offense exists
at common law. The criminal conspiracy statute, Utah Code Ann. § 76-4-201 (1987), requires
a showing of substantially similar elements: (1)

dence, but that the evidence indicates a
normal business transaction that unfortunately happened to go sour.
[1] To prove a civil conspiracy, plaintiff
must show the following elements: (1) a
combination of two or more persons, (2) an
object to be accomplished, (3) a meeting of
the minds on the object or course of action, (4) one or more unlawful, overt acts,
and (5) damages as a proximate result
thereof. Citizen State Bank v. Gilmore,
226 Kan. 662, 603 P.2d 605, 613 (1979);
Duffy v. Butte Teachers' Union, 168 Mont
246, 541 P.2d 1199, 1202 (1975) (quoting
15A CJ.S. Conspiracy §§ 1, 2).7 Plaintiff must present clear and convincing
evidence to carry his burden of proof on a
charge of civil conspiracy. Crane Co. v.
Dahle, 576 P.2d 870, 872 (Utah 1978).
/ & II: Two or More Persons and Object
to be Accomplished
Plaintiff asserts the following theory:
All persons involved in this transaction
joined in the alleged conspiracy. Their object was to defraud Pagan, whom they
previously knew to be mentally deficient
and, therefore, helpless, by taking his $44,000.00 property for $16,857.43, each obtaining some of the profit for himself. Capitol
was to immediately receive a "kick-back"
payment of $4,848.75 from Black; later,
$39,300.00 from a trustee's sale of the
property; and an additional $32,325.00
from a deficiency judgment against Cannon. Thereby, it could realize a $76,473.75
return from an initial investment of $32,325.00. Hanks, Cannon, and Black, immediately after closing, were to jointly receive
$13,471.57 over the agreed first mortgage
price, while the real estate agents were to
receive exorbitant fees for their services.
[2] Supporting this theory were the
facts that Pagan only received $16,857.43
intention that the conduct constituting a crime
be performed, (2) agreement between two or
more persons to engage in or cause the criminal
conduct, and (3) commission of an overt act in
pursuance of the conspiracy by any one of the
conspirators. A civil action further requires
that there be damage as a proximate result of
the conspiracy. Duffy, 541 ?2d at 1202.
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from the transaction, that $4,848.75 was,
indeed, paid to Capitol immediately after
the transaction took place, and that Capitol
ultimately received $39,300.00 from the
trustee's sale of the property. However,
the record also indicates that Capitol's deficiency action was for only $12,726.58. The
difference between the original principal
amount and the amount Capitol attempted
to recover was accrued interest at 22%.
Further, the record does not indicate that
Hanks received any proceeds from the $13,471.57 loan, but that the loan was disbursed to Cannon, and fails to indicate why
Cannon would enter into such an unfavorable agreement Thus, we find that there is
no clear and convincing evidence that the
parties' evil object was to defraud Pagan.
///.

A Meeting of the Minds

[3] There is no direct evidence in the
record of a meeting of the parties' minds
with respect to defrauding Pagan of his
property. However, it is not necessary in a
civil conspiracy action to prove that the parties actually came together and entered into
a formal agreement to do the acts complained of by direct evidence. Holmes v.
McKey, 383 P.2d 655, 665 (Okl.1962). Instead, conspiracy may be inferred from circumstantial evidence, including the nature
of the act done, the relations of the parties,
and the interests of the alleged conspirators. Wyatt v. Union Mortgage Co., 24
Cal. 3d 773, 157 Cal.Rptr. 392, 398-99, 598
P.2d 45, 51-52 (1979); Chicago Title Ins.
Co. v. Great Western Fin. Corp., 69 Cal.2d
305, 70 CaLRptr. 849, 856, 444 P.2d 481,
488 (1968). To prove conspiracy to defraud
by circumstantial evidence, though, "there
must be substantial proof of circumstances
from which it reasonably follows, or at
least may be reasonably inferred, that the
conspiracy existed. It cannot be established by conjecture and speculation alone."
Dill v. Rader, 583 P.2d 496, 499 (Okl.1978)
(quoting Chisler v. Randall, 124 Kan. 278,
259 P. 687 (1927)).
The act in question is a real estate transaction, which normally requires the services of real estate agents, loan companies,
title companies, and the existence of a buy-

er and seller. Such parties were present in
this transaction.
The record clearly indicates that Black
and Cannon, the buyers, were working together and that Hanks and the real estate
agents were aware of that relationship.
Stewart Title drew up all the documents
except those prepared by Capitol. Black
had a prior relationship with Capitol, including a $4,848.75 debt, which he paid off
with proceeds from the $32,325.00 loan.
Capitol required Stewart Title to pay back
the $4,848.75 sum, to record its interest in
the Pagan property first, and to disburse
the proceeds of the loan to Cannon. Sisk,
of Stewart Title, recorded Capitol's trust
deed prior to Pagan's, pursuant to Capitol's
instructions. The record indicates that the
parties did not know of Pagan's mental
infirmity prior to the transaction, but met
Pagan for the first time at the closing.
Pagan's expert witness, Dr. William Barrett, testified that a lay person would not
be able to tell that Pagan was mentally
disabled by looking at him.
Plaintiff asserts that these facts adequately support the inference that Hanks,
Black, and Cannon engaged in a confidence
game to defraud Pagan, whom they previously knew to be mentally deficient, of his
property, indicating that the parties had a
meeting of the minds on the object of the
conspiracy.
[4] However, not only does the evidence
directly contradict plaintiffs desired inference that the conspirators knew about Pagan's mental deficiency prior to the transaction, but the other facts do not necessarily or even reasonably lead to the inference
that the parties were doing anything but
engaging in a normal real estate transaction. Specifically, uncontroverted evidence
was presented at trial that finder's fee
arrangements were normal banking practice for this type of Joan, as was CapitoYs
requirement of taking a first trust deed
against the property. Further, the record
indicates that Stewart Title was not aware
of the details of the Capitol loan prior to
the transaction. Thus, the evidence does
not provide anything more substantial than
conjecture and speculation to show the ex-

746 PACIFIC REPORTER, 2d SERIES
istence of a conspiratorial relationship between the parties.
IV.

Unlawful Act

[5] To assert civil conspiracy, plaintiff
must also prove that the alleged conspirators
performed one or more unlawful, overt acts.
If the object of the alleged conspiracy or the
means used to attain it is lawful, even if damage results to plaintiff or defendant acted
with a malicious motive, there can be no civil
action for conspiracy. "If such were not the
rule, obviously many purely business dealings would give rise to an action in tort on
behalf of one who may have been adversely
affected." Duffy, 541 P.2d at 1202.
Plaintiffs brief suggests that the allegedly unlawful overt act at issue is fraud.
The Utah Supreme Court, in Taylor v. Gasor, Inc., 607 P.2d 293, 294 (Utah 1980),
defines fraud as:
the making of a false representation concerning a presently existing material fact
which the representor either knew to be
false or made recklessly without sufficient knowledge, or the omission of a
material fact when there is a duty to
disclose, for the purpose of inducing action on the part of the other party, with
actual, justifiable reliance resulting in
damage to that party.
[6,7] A person cannot be liable for
fraud unless he made the false representations himself, authorized someone to make
them for him, or participated in the misrepresentation in some way, such as through a
conspiracy. 37 CJ.S. Fraud § 61 (1943).
There is no direct evidence in the present
case that Capitol misrepresented a material
fact known to be false. Nor is there direct
evidence that Capitol acted for the purpose
of inducing Pagan to sell his home or that
Pagan relied upon Capitol's actions. Since
8. l i l t is not sufficient that the circumstances
lead to a mere suspicion of fraud, nor are they
sufficient where they are as consistent with honesty and good faith as with fraud. When the
proved or omitted facts are consistent with-any
reasonable theory of good faith and honest intent,
they should be so construed. Fraud cannot be
inferred or presumed from ambiguous evidence — When it is sought to prove fraud by cir-

Capitol did not, by its own actions, defraud
Pagan or authorize another to do so, Capitol's liability can only be established by
proving that it was engaged in a conspiracy
to defraud. However, the evidence shows
that, other than providing financing, Capitol did not participate in Black's plan to
purchase the home.8
Plaintiff argues that the evidence supports the following inferences: Hanks and
Capitol were fully aware that the "notorious" real estate promoter, Black, was acting in concert with Cannon, whom they
knew at the time to be a judgment-proof
"straw man" unable to repay a $32,325.00
loan at 22%. They also knew that Black
and Cannon had never requested or applied
for a loan. Nevertheless, Capitol drafted
the note and the first trust deed in Cannon's name without considering the $44,000.00 sales price of the property and disregarded the $24,000.00 mortgage, of
which Hanks was fully aware, between Pagan and Cannon. At the closing, judgment-proof Cannon was switched for Black
as the buyer, while Hanks deliberately concealed the terms of the $32,325.00 loan
from Pagan during the closing by delivering the loan documents to Stewart Title
prior to the closing, but not disclosing them
until after the closing was completed and
the parties had left The promoters, Cannon and Black, refused to make any payments on the $32,325.00 note or on the
$24,000.00 contract, knowing that the trust
deed on the $32,325.00 note would be foreclosed long before the due date on the
$24,000.00 contract, and that because they
were judgment-proof anyway, they would
not be required to repay the loan. Furthermore, the entire transaction was financed
entirely out of Pagan's equity, while the
other parties received all the benefits without paying for them.
cumstantial evidence, the fraud must be such as
would reasonably and naturally follow from the
circumstances so proved, and fraud will not be
lightly inferred. The collateral facts from which
the inference of fraud is sought to be drawn must
be proved precisely as facts are proved in other
cases. Presumptions of fact from presumptions
are not sufficient" 37 CJ.S. Fraud § 115 (1943)
(footnote omitted).
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Plaintiff has the burden of presenting
clear and convincing evidence supporting his conspiracy theory. Dill, 583 P.2d
at 499; Crane v. Dahle, 576 P.2d 870, 872
(Utah 1978). This evidence must do more
than merely raise a suspicion—it must
lead to belief that the conspiracy existed.
Dill, 583 P.2d at 499 (emphasis in original).
Such evidence is sufficient if it shows that
the circumstances are consistent only with
the existence of a conspiracy. John Davis
and Co. v. Cedar Glen No. Four, Inc., 75
Wash.2d 214, 450 P.2d 166, 172 (1969). Evidence is insufficient if it discloses acts just
as consistent with a lawful purpose as with
an unlawful one. Accurate Prods., Inc.
v. Snow, 67 Wash.2d 416, 408 P.2d 1, 7
(1965); Dill, 583 P.2d at 499.' "Common
sense and reason dictate that evil inferences should not be permitted to be drawn
from routine business transactions where
there are no other transactions. To hold
otherwise would throw the door open for
an attack on each and every transaction
that one might enter into." Holland v.
Columbia Iron Mining Co., 4 Utah 2d 303,
293 P.2d 700, 702 (1956). Evidence, viewed
in the light most favorable to the verdict,
"disregarding evidence and inferences to
the contrary," is, therefore, considered as a
whole to determine whether the alleged
conspirators were actually united in a
scheme to defraud the plaintiff. Morris v.
Dodge Country, Inc., 85 N.M. 491, 513
P.2d 1273, 1274 (1973).
We accord due deference to the jury as
the fact finder and do not substitute ourselves in this role. However, an appellant
may successfully attack a jury's verdict by
"[marshalling] all the evidence supporting
the verdict and then [demonstrating] that,
even viewing the evidence in the light most
9. Tacts of trifling importance when considered
separately, or slight circumstances trivial and
inconclusive in themselves, may afford clear
evidence of fraud when considered in connection with each other. It has been said that in
most cases fraud can be made out only by a
concatenation of circumstances, many of which
in themselves amount to very little, but in connection with others make a strong case."
Holmes v. McKey, 383 P.2d 655, 666 (Okl.1963)
(citing Griffith v. Scott, 128 Okl. 125, 261 P. 371
(1927)). However, "[wjhere subsequent acts are
relied upon to establish a conspiracy, they must

favorable to that verdict, the evidence is
insufficient to support it" Von Hake v.
Thomas, 705 P.2d 766, 769 (Utah 1985).
In the present case, the facts viewed as a
whole not only do not compel an inference
of conspiracy, but directly contradict plaintiffs conspiracy theory in many respects:
First, Black's "notorious" reputation, with
which Hanks was supposedly familiar, is
unsupported by the record. Documentary
evidence discloses that Cannon, rather than
being judgment-proof at the time of the
transaction, was in a strong financial position, but his fortunes reversed, making him
judgment-proof at the time of trial. Despite Cannon's assertions to the contrary,
documentary evidence indicates that he did,
in fact, personally apply for the loan with
Capitol, and that the loan was granted on
the basis of his then financial strength.
The amount of the loan was not made in
total disregard of the value of Pagan's
property, but was well within reasonable
limits (65 to 85% of the appraised value of
the property). The substitution of Cannon
for Black was not only within the terms of
the earnest money agreement, which directed that the name in which title would
be vested would be designated at the time
of closing, but was fully disclosed to Pagan, and was made on the basis of Cannon's relative financial strength as compared to Black's. Furthermore, it is uncontroverted that Hanks delivered the loan
documents to Stewart Title after, not, as
plaintiffs attorney alleges, before the closing; that the parties were aware of the
loan's existence, approximate amount, and
priority; and that Pagan had been informed of it
clearly indicate the prior collusive combination
and fraudulent purpose and must warrant the
conclusion that the subsequent acts were done
in furtherance of the unlawful combination and
in pursuance of the fraudulent scheme. Disconnected circumstances, any one of which, or all of
which, are fust as consistent with a lawful purpose as with an unlawful undertaking, are insufficient to establish a conspiracy." Dill, 583 P.2d
at 499. (emphasis in original) (quoting Ballontine v. Cummings, 220 Pa. 621, 70 A. 546, 547
(1908).)
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The purchasers did, indeed, have some
equity in the property and did, in fact,
make efforts to repay the loan. Documentary evidence indicates that Cannon paid
$1,000.00 earnest money directly from the
loan proceeds, and personally extended the
loan when it went into default An unidentified person made a $2,700.00 payment on
the loan pursuant to its being extended.
Finally, the record shows that while Pagan
paid closing costs customarily paid for by
the seller, Cannon paid the closing costs
customarily paid for by the buyer from his
loan proceeds. Thus, many of the inferences upon which plaintiff relies to prove his
fraud charge are totally unfounded because they are directly contradicted by uncontroverted evidence. Therefore, to adapt
plaintiffs theory, the jury's finding would
have to be based on conjecture and speculation.
V. Damages
[8] Finally, to assert a claim for civil
conspiracy, plaintiff must show that he sustained damage as a proximate result of
the conspiracy's activities because the conspiracy itself is not what gives rise to the
right to action, but the torts committed in
the furtherance of the conspiracy. Duffy,
541 P.2d at 1202; Chicago Title Ins. Co.,
444 P.2d at 488.
Plaintiff asserts that Pagan was damaged by losing $27,147.57 as a result of this
transaction because he received only $16,857.43 in exchange for his $44,000.00 equity. Pagan sustained damage. However,
because plaintiff has not shown sufficient
evidence to reasonably imply the existence
of a conspiracy, he cannot say that Pagan's
loss was caused by the alleged conspiracy.
The purpose of a civil conspiracy action
is to connect participating members in a
transaction who otherwise would not be
liable to the plaintiff. Duffy, 541 P.2d at
1202. Because Cannon, against whom Pagan could legitimately have a right of action, is judgment-proof, plaintiffs presumed purpose in arguing a conspiracy theory against Capitol is to obtain a judgment
payable from Capitol's resources. However, even though the results of this transaction are unfortunate and possibly unfair,

we find that there is insufficient evidence
to support the jury's finding that Capitol
acted together with Cannon in a conspiracy
to defraud Israel Pagan. Therefore, we
reverse and remand for proceedings consistent with this opinion.
Because we do not find sufficient evidence to support plaintiffs conspiracy theory, Capitol is not liable for compensatory
and punitive damages. Therefore, it is not
necessary to address the issue of punitive
damages.
JACKSON, J., concurs.
BENCH, J., concurs in result only.
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ADDENDUM "B"

IH THE UTAH STATE COURT OF APPEALS
—0O0 —

Israel Pagara Estate and Leonor C. Pagan,
Personal Representative,
Plainrxff and Respondent,
v.
Joseph H- C?Tnnn# Dorius Black, Alpha Leasing
Company, a partnership; Robert D. Apgood,
Joseph N. Carmen, Dorius Black, and Richard
McKean, doing business under the name and
style of Alpha Leasing Company; Bill Brown
Realty, Incnrporated; Scott Peatross, personally;
Stewart Title Company of Utah; Tommy W. Sisk;
Capitol Thrift and Loan, a financial corporation;
and Merlyn Hanks,
Defendsats and Appellant-

ORDER
860072-CA

—0O0—

Before Judges Garff, Bench, and Jackson.
Pursart to the Rules of the Utah Court of Appeals 3(a),
appellant's petition for rehearing is denied.
Dated this 2nd day of December, 19 87.

FOR THE COURT:

TfaJL-

Timothy M. Shea
Clerk of the Court

ADDENDUM "C"

1.

UTAH CONSTITUTION, ARTICLE I, SECTION 10

In capital cases the right of trial by jury
shall remain inviolate. In courts of general
jurisdiction, except in capital cases, a jury
shall consist of eight jurors. In courts of
inferior jurisdiction a jury shall consist of four
jurors. In criminal cases the verdict shall be
unanimous. In civil cases three-fourths of the
jurors may find a verdict. A jury in civil cases
shall be waived unless demanded.
2-

U.C-A. SUBSECTION 78-2-2(5)(1988)

The Supreme Court has sole discretion in
granting or denying a petition for writ of
certiorari for the review of a Court of Appeals
adjudication, but the Supreme Court shall review
those cases certified to it by the Court of
Appeals under Subsection (3)(b).
3.

RULE 43, RULES OF THE UTAH SUPREME COURT
—CONSIDERATIONS GOVERNING REVIEW OF
CERTIORARI

Review by a writ of certiorari is not a
matter of right, but of judicial discretion, and
will be granted only when there are special and
important reasons therefor. The following, while
neither controlling nor wholly measuring the
Court's discretion, indicate the character of
reasons that will be considered:
(1) When a panel of the' Court of
Appeals has rendered a decision in conflict with a
decision of another panel of the Court of Appeals
on the same issue of law;
(2) When a panel of the Court of
Appeals has decided a question of state or federal
law in a way that is in conflict with a decision
of this Court;
(3) When a panel of the Court of
Appeals has rendered a decision that has so far
departed from the accepted and usual course of
judicial proceedings or has so far sanctioned such
a departure by a lower court as to call for an
exercise of this Court's power of supervision; or
(4) When the Court Of Appeals has
decided an important question of municipal, state,
or federal law which has not been, but should be,
settled by this Court.

ADDENDUM "D"

Under the law, it does not necessarily follow from a
finding that one member of a partnership is liable for punitive
damages that any or all of other members of the partnership are
also liable for punitive damages- • The acts or omissions of one
partner will justify an award of punitive damages against
another partner or partners if and only if those acts or
omissions are within the ordinary course and scope of partnership business and the other partner or partners against
punitive damages are awarded authroized, participated in, or
ratified those acts or omissions.
If you find that the acts or omissions of Joseph N. Cann<
justify an award of punitive damages against him, punitive
damages may be awarded agains the other partners of Alpha Leasing if, and only if, you find by the
preponderance of the
le pre
evidence each of the following elements
1.

That at the time of the events at which this
lawsuit occurred Joseph N. Cannon was acting as a
partner of Alpha Leasing Company;

2.

That the acts of Joseph N. Cannon were within the
ordinary course and scope of Alpha Leasing's business

3.

That each of the partners against whom punitive
damages are awarded sought, authorized, participated
in, or ratified the acts or omissions of Joseph
N. Cannon.

INSTRUCTION NO.

^

Qz?

In addition to the actual damages plaintiff alleges
he has sustianed, he also seeks to recover punitive or exemplary
damages against the defendants.

If you find the issues in

favor of the plaintiff and that he is entitled to recover
actual damages, you may also consider whether the plaintiff
is entitled to such punitive damages.
Before punitive damages may be awarded, you must find
the issues in favor of the plaintiff and against the individual
defendants, and further you must find form
the evidence that the individual defendants' conduct in injuring
the plaintiff was willfull and malicious.

If you so find,

you may award, if you deem it proper to do so, such sum as
in your judgment would be reasonable and proper as a punishment to that defendant for such wrongs, and as a wholesome
warning to others not to offend in like manner.
punitive damages are given, you should

If such

award them with

caution and you should keep in mind that they are only for the
purpose just mentioned and are not the measure of actual damage.
Such damages must not exceed the amount prayed for by the
plaintiff.

JURY INSTRUCTION NO

•-J2.

If you find that plaintiff suffered damage as a proximate result of the conduct of any of the defendants en which
you base a finding of liability, you may then consider whether
you should award punitive or exemplary damages against such
defendant for the sake of example and by way of punishmer.-.
You may in your discretion award such damages, if, but cr.ly
if, you find/by a preponderance of the evidence that said
^

defendant's acts were wilful or malicious in the conduce en
which ycu base your finding of liability.
In arriving at any award of punitive damages, you
are to consider the following:
1.

The reprehensibility of the conduct of the defen-

2.

The amount of punitive damages which will have a

dant.

deterrent effect on the defendant.
3.

That the punitive damages must bear a reasonable

relation to the actual damages.

